Exemptions from punishment in China and Thailand from the perspective of the theory of Leon Petrazyck by Chitov, Alexandre N.
Правоведение. 2018. Т. 62. № 3 
570 https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu25.2018.309
© Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2019
UDC 343
Exemptions from punishment in China and Thailand from 
the perspective of the theory of Leon Petrazycki*
Alexandre N. Chitov
For citation: Chitov, Alexandre N. 2018. Exemptions from punishment in China and Thailand from 
the perspective of the theory of Leon Petrazyck. Pravovedenie 62 (3): 570–581. 
https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu25.2018.309
This paper compares legislative provisions of Chinese and Thai laws pertaining to exemptions 
from punishment. These exemptions must be distinguished from the exemptions from criminal 
liability. In the latter case, Chinese and Thai courts cannot inflict punishment on a person who 
is justified or excused in committing an act otherwise defined as a crime. In contrast, an ex-
emption from punishment is granted by courts as an exercise of discretionary powers. Chinese 
and Thai laws bear similar characteristics in defining the exemptions from criminal liability, but 
differ significantly in the scope of discretionary powers of courts to exempt from punishments. 
Chinese law allows judges to have more discretion in not imposing penalties on an offender 
than Thai law does. The reason for the difference lies in a greater openness of Chinese law to 
moral considerations to be played in sentencing practices. Thai law is much more influenced 
by the philosophy of legal positivism. These similarities and differences are discussed in the 
light of the theory of Leon Petrazycki. It is argued that Petyrazycki’s concept of intuitive law 
as attributive imperatives is important in explaining and justifying the powers of the court not 
to inflict punishment if it meets the goals of criminal justice. From the viewpoint of the theory 
of Petrazycki, Chinese law can accommodate better the intuitive law of the public to the exi-
gencies of various social situations. However, Petrazycki’s theory alone cannot override many 
reasons against giving judges extensive powers to apply their intuitive laws to exempt offenders 
from punishment. There is a plurality of psychological imperatives which may conflict with each 
other. To resolve those conflicts, it is necessary to draw on the idea of natural law. Even though 
Petrazycki did not explicitly argue for the existence of the natural law, its existence can be drawn 
from common psychological imperatives as well as from a striking similarity between various 
systems of criminal law in such diverse countries as China and Thailand. Many of the legal provi-
sions of their laws display certain common legal paradigms that cannot be only accounted for 
by the adoption of the Western legal concepts. 
Keywords: criminal liability, punishment, Thailand, China, psychological theory of law, Petra-
zycki. 
Introduction
The exemption from punishment is defined here as an exercise of discretionary pow-
ers by courts not to inflict penalties on an offender. In this sense, it is different from the 
exemptions from criminal liability. The amount of literature on the relationship between 
criminal liability and punishment is enormous. It is commonly asserted that “criminal li-
ability is the strongest formal censure that society can inflict, and it may also result in a 
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sentence which amounts to a severe deprivation of the ordinary liberties of the offender”1. 
Therefore, one has to acknowledge that being subject to criminal liability does not always 
mean to be subject to punishment. As another writer has rightly put it: “’To be liable to 
punishment’ means ‘may, according to the rules, be punished.’ It does not necessarily 
mean ‘deserved to be punished’. Furthermore, liability need not entail actual punishment 
any more than being culpable entails actually being blamed. Of course, some pronounce-
ments of desert (‘You are to blame for this.’) are acts of blaming. The culpability of the 
agent, however, is a prerequisite of just blaming. In the same way, while ‘liable to punish-
ment’ is often taken to mean ‘will be punished’, liability is distinct from actual punishment. 
It is in this sense that legal liability is understood as candidacy for punishment”2. 
The distinction between being liable to punishment and being deserved to be pun-
ished is particularly appropriate to describe the conflict between the official law and the 
standards of law maintained by one’s conscience. There can be many situations when 
one can see that a person liable to punishment does not deserve it, and a person who 
deserves it may not be liable. This conflict has been well described by a Russian scholar 
of Polish descent, Leon Petrazycki3, more than a hundred years ago. His theory of intuitive 
law deserves a recognition and attention by the modern philosophy of criminal justice. Its 
significance becomes more apparent after taking cognizance of Petrazycki’s understand-
ing of legal responsibility. His ideas have been explored, to some extent, in several works4. 
However, almost all the books of Petrazycki (his heritage amounts to 35 volumes) are still 
inaccessible to an English speaking reader. There is only one shortened translation of his 
two volume work Theory of Law and State, published by the Harvard University Press in 
1955.
Petrazycki’s approach to legal responsibility to some extent reflects the same con-
cern found among the leading British legal theorists, that the treatment of criminal liability 
often misses the relational dimensions of criminal responsibility (Duff 2007, 15)5. Unlike 
Duff, Petrazycki does not attempt to draw fine distinctions between the meanings of li-
ability and responsibility. Instead, he analyses the moral nature of impulsions that bring 
about the norms of criminal justice as well as of other branches of law. The implica-
tions of his theory for criminal law are particularly of interest in the Far Eastern context, 
which does not easily accommodates the Western philosophical categories of criminal 
justice6.
The application of Petrazycki’s theory is limited here to a critical examination of Chi-
nese and Thai legislative provisions on exemptions from punishment. It implies that al-
lowing a broader scope of judicial discretion in exempting offenders from punishment 
does not mean an admission of arbitrariness and a disregard for the principle of legality. 
In order to meet the interests of justice in particular cases, the law must give space for ju-
dicial discretion. According to this theory, judges are compelled to follow the intuitive law. 
The problem, however, arises when intuitive laws are conflicting with each other. As it will 
1 Ashworth A., Horder J. Principles of criminal law. Oxford: University Press, 2013. P. 1.
2 Sistare C. T. Responsibility and Criminal Liability. Vol. 7. Heidelberg: Springer Science & Business 
Media, 1989. P. 17.
3 Petrazycki L. Theory of Law and State. St. Petersburg: Merkushev, 1910.
4 Gorecki J. Sociology and jurisprudence of Leon Petrażycki. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975; 
Rudzinski A.W. Petrazycki’s Significance for Contemporary Legal and Moral Theory // American Journal 
of Jurisprudence. 1976. No. 21. P. 107–130; Sadurska R. Jurisprudence of Leon Petrazycki // American 
Journal of Jurisprudence. 1987. No. 32. P. 63–98.
5 Duff R. A. Answering for crime: Responsibility and liability in the criminal law. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007. P. 15.
6 For example, Duff’s distinction between criminal responsibility and criminal liability does not make 
sense in Chinese or Thai languages as they mean the same thing. The Chinese term 刑事责任 as well as the 
Thai term ความรับผิดในทางอาญา mean both criminal liability and criminal responsibility.
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be demonstrated below, Petrazycki, despite his concern for a rational legal policy, does 
not offer the solution to reconcile conflicting intuitive laws in relation to exemptions from 
punishment. It is argued that this basis can be found in the concept of intuitive natural 
law.   
Exceptions from criminal liability in Chinese and Thai laws
In order to understand better the differences between Thai and Chinese laws on the 
exemptions from punishment, one has to look first at the exemptions from criminal li-
ability as reflected in the respective laws. There is a striking similarity in the exemptions 
from criminal liability found in Thai and Chinese legislation despite the differences in their 
expressions. For example, Article 16 of Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(1979, 1997, 2011) states that an act is not a crime if it objectively results in harmful con-
sequences due to irresistible or unforeseeable causes rather than intent or negligence. 
Thai criminal law (Thai Penal Code ประมวล กฎหมายอาญา ฉบับ พิมพ์ พ. ศ. (2558)) does 
not contain explicitly such a provision. It only states in Section 59 that “a person shall be 
criminally liable only when such a person commits an act intentionally, except in cases 
when the law provides that such a person commits an act by negligence, or except in 
cases when the law clearly provides that such a person must be liable even though com-
mitting an act unintentionally.” The last part of the Section can be interpreted as allowing 
criminal liability in cases when there is neither intent nor negligence, if the legislator ex-
plicitly chooses so. In other words, Chinese criminal law is more restrictive by forbidding 
imposition of criminal liability in the cases of harm caused objectively beyond intent or 
negligence of a person.
From reading Article 16 of Chinese Criminal Law, one may suppose that criminal liabil-
ity is limited only to the situations of intentional or negligent harm which already occurred. 
However, the harm principle, is not the only basis for criminalization policies adopted by 
the Chinese legislators. Article 13 maintains a different principle: crime is an act that en-
dangers (危害) society. In a number of provisions dealing with specific offences, Chinese 
law criminalizes acts that are done in violation of state regulations even if there are no 
harmful consequences.7  
Article 17 of Chinese Criminal Law exempts all minors from criminal liability who did 
not reach the age of 16 at the time of offence (or 14 years in cases of intentional homicide 
or injury, rape, robbery, drug-trafficking, arson, explosion or poisoning). However, the 
court can order the head of the young offender’s family or a guardian to discipline (加以
管教) the offending youth. Thai law (Section 73) exempts from criminal liability children 
below 7 years old. The same applies to the children between 7 and 14, but the court has 
the power to admonish the child, or to give an appropriate order to the parents or guard-
ians, or to hand the child over to a person or organization which is suitable to take care of 
him. 
In relation to mentally ill persons (精神病人), the Chinese law stipulates that they are 
not liable at a time when they are unable to recognize or control their own conduct. If a 
mental patient does not lose completely the ability of recognizing or controlling his own 
conduct, he shall still be liable, although he may deserve a lighter punishment (Article 18). 
Thai law exempts not only mentally ill people but also any offender who at the time of com-
mitting an offence “was not able to appreciate the nature, or illegality of his act (ไม่สามารถ
รู้ผิดชอบ) or not being able to control himself on account of defective mind (มีจิตบกพร่อง), 
mental disease (โรคจิต) or mental infirmity (จิตฟั่นเฟือน)” (Section 65). Such a wording can 
7 See for example Article 185a which penalizes the use of public funds (however beneficial or not 
harmful it might be) in violation of state regulations.
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exempt from criminal liability any person who could not appreciate the nature of their ac-
tions or were not able to control themselves by any other reason than mental illness. For 
example, certain defects of mind can be caused by aging (Zarit & Zarit 2012, 5)8, or by 
other illnesses not clinically classified as mental illnesses. 
The narrow construction of the meaning of mental disorders may had influenced the 
Chinese legislators when they gave the power to the courts to reduce punishment of old 
people above the age of 75 (Article 17a). Considering the broad provisions of Section 65, 
Thai law does not need to offer a different treatment for old people, although there are 
some provisions which require to consider the age of the sentenced person in relation to 
social services (Section 30/1), or suspension of  imprisonment sentence (Article 56). 
Further, Chinese law explicitly excludes intoxicated persons from the exceptions to 
criminal liability (Article 18). Thai law again offers a more flexible approach exempting from 
criminal liability those who are intoxicated without their knowledge or against their will, 
if they are unable to understand the nature of their acts or unable to control themselves 
(Section 66).  
Article 20 of Chinese Criminal Law excludes any person from criminal liability who 
acted in justifiable defence. It is defined as any act that “a person commits to stop an un-
lawful infringement in order to prevent the interests of the state and the public, or his own 
or other person’s rights of the person, property, or other rights from being infringed upon 
by the on-going infringement, thus harming the perpetrator.” This, however, must not 
exceed the limits of necessity. Similarly, Thai Penal Code requires (Section 68) that the 
defence must be reasonable (กระทำาพอสมควรแก่เหตุ) in order to avoid completely criminal 
liability.
The exclusion of criminal liability on the ground of necessity is similarly regulated 
by the criminal laws of China and Thailand. Article 21 of Chinese law states that “if a per-
son is compelled to commit an act in an emergency to avert an immediate danger to the 
interests of the State or the public, or his own or another person’s rights of the person, 
property or other rights, thus causing damage, he shall not bear criminal liability.” How-
ever, Thai law defines necessity somewhat wider as including, apart from the situations 
of emergency to avert a danger to the public or private interests, also the situations when 
a person “is under compulsion or under the influence of a force that he cannot avoid or 
resist” (Section 67). 
One significant difference between Chinese and Thai legislation is that Thai law ex-
plicitly excludes criminal liability in cases of a mistake of fact (Section 62). This section has 
been used by Thai courts to exclude from criminal liability a person who shot a person who 
thought to be attacking the accused (Thai Supreme Court 1873/2522, p. 1554), a person 
who forced a woman to sexual intercourse supposing her to remain his lawful wife (Thai 
Supreme Court 430/2532, p. 395); a person who destroyed a fence of a neighbor mistak-
enly supposing the fence to be on his territory (Thai Supreme Court 89/2519, p. 53), etc. 
Nevertheless, the mistake of fact is also known to Chinese criminal law theory and is used 
in establishing the lack of intent9, even though it is not expressed in the text of Chinese 
Criminal Law.
There are some other differences. In a number of offences, particularly related to 
property, the spouse of the victim is exempted from criminal liability according to Thai 
Penal Code (Section 71). No such an exemption exists in Chinese law. Another difference 
is that Thai law (Section 70) exempts from criminal liability anyone who acts in accordance 
8 Zarit S. H., Zarit J. M. Mental disorders in older adults: Fundamentals of assessment and treatment. 
New York: Guilford Press, 2011. P. 5.
9 Badar M. E. The concept of Mens Rea in international criminal law: The case for a Unified Approach. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013. P. 188.
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with an illegal order of an official, if he has a duty to comply with the order unless that per-
son knows that the order is unlawful. Chinese law does not have a similar provision.
Despite these differences in defining exemptions from criminal liability, Chinese and 
Thai laws are remarkably similar. How can we explain this similarity between so diverse 
countries? One reason can be the influence of the Western law through the processes of 
globalization. However, this explanation may be superficial. The analysis of the exemp-
tions from punishment based on the discretionary powers of courts illustrates the fact that 
Chinese and Thai criminal law provisions can also be very different.
Exemptions from punishment and the discretionary powers of courts
The exemptions from punishment can be not only mandatory but also be based on 
the discretion of courts. The line between the exemptions from criminal liability and ex-
emptions from punishment may not always be clear, particularly in the circumstances of 
specific cases. There are many provisions in Chinese Criminal law which give the power 
to the courts not to inflict punishment on the defendant who committed an offence. A 
person, who exceeded limits of necessity while defending oneself or others, according to 
Chinese law, “shall be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment” 
(Article 20, 21). Thai law, in contrast, does not permit a complete exemption from liability 
unless a criminal act occurs “out of excitement, fright or fear”. In this case, the exemption 
is mandatory (Section 69). In other cases of exceeding justifiable limits, Thai courts are 
allowed to reduce but not to exempt from punishment completely.
 Further, Chinese Criminal Law contains a very flexible provision that “anyone who is 
coerced to participate in a crime shall be given a mitigated punishment or be exempted 
from punishment in the light of the circumstances of the crime he commits” (Article 28). 
In other words, Chinese courts have discretion to exempt or not exempt from punishment 
those who are coerced in taking part in a criminal activity. A similar provision apples to ac-
complices who play a secondary or auxiliary role in a joint crime (Article 27). In contrast, 
Thai law requires that such an accomplice is punished by two-thirds of the punishment 
imposed for a particular crime (Section 86). 
There are other occasions when Chinese law gives discretion to the courts to exempt 
a person committing an offence from punishment. For example, deaf-mute or blind people 
can be completely exempted from punishment or the punishment can be reduced (Article 
19).  Article 22 allows courts, without specifying the reasons, to exempt from punishment 
those who prepare for a crime but do not commit. This is different from the cases when an 
offender voluntarily discontinues the crime and effectively prevents the consequences of 
the crime from occurring, he must be exempted from punishment if no damage is caused 
(Article 24). In the latter cases, exemption from punishment is mandatory. Thai law con-
tains a similar mandatory exemption. The person who attempts crime but then “voluntarily 
desists from carrying it through, or changes his mind and prevents the act from achieving 
its end” must be exempted from punishment (Section 82). 
Further, Article 37 of Chinese law states that “if the circumstances of a person’s crime 
are minor and do not require criminal punishment, he may be exempted from it; however, he 
may, depending on the different circumstances of the case, be reprimanded or ordered to 
make a statement of repentance, offer an apology or pay compensation for the losses, or 
be subjected to administrative penalty or administrative sanctions by the competent depart-
ment.” Thai law generally does not give discretion to the courts to exempt from punishment. 
An exception is in inflicting punishment on an offender over 14 years old but not over 17 
years (Section 75) and for attempting crime by acting “out of besotted belief” (โดยความเช่ือ
อย่างงมงาย) (Section 81). Besotted belief is understood as largely the one which is caused 
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by a superstition or a belief in magic (Thai Supreme Court, 4495/2546). Chinese contem-
porary law ignores the use of magic to harm other persons all together, although the ancient 
law of this country considered the use of sorcery among the ten abominations which were 
punished the most severely (Tang Code, Chapter 1, Article 6 (5))10. 
Thus, despite many similarities in relation to the exemptions from criminal liability, Chi-
nese and Thai criminal laws differ fundamentally as Chinese law gives judges greater dis-
cretionary powers not to inflict punishment on offenders. In this respect, the question aris-
es whether or not Thai law does better by adhering to the principle of legality more strictly 
than Chinese criminal law. The underlying philosophy of Thai criminal law is following. If law 
makes an offence liable to punishment, it is obvious that the task of the courts is to enforce 
law. Criminal law offences must be constructed strictly and applied equally. If there are ex-
ceptions from punishment, these exceptions must be specific and clearly articulated in law. 
Consequently, granting broad discretionary powers to the courts in exempting offenders 
from punishment goes against the principle of legality11. 
However, the Chinese approach may address better the interests of social policy and 
even traditional morality not to punish offenders in the cases when the consequences of 
crime are not serious or the offender does not represent a danger to the society12. This 
can be particularly seen in Article 37 that allows the courts, instead of punishment, to 
reprimand, to order to make a statement of repentance or offer an apology, or to pay com-
pensation for the losses, etc. It conforms better than Thai law to the idea of a criminal trial 
as a spectacle of public censure13 without the necessity to inflict a penalty on a convicted 
offender. 
In Chinese law, as well as in the few discussed instances of Thai law, the nature of the 
powers of the courts not to inflict punishment is not always obvious. When a court decides 
not to impose punishment on a person, does it mean that the perpetrator of an act oth-
erwise punishable does not deserve it, or he remains to be blamed but punishment is not 
inflicted on the considerations of mercy?14 Is this power the way through which judges can 
bring their moral perceptions of crime into play? If so, does it not contradict the principle 
of the rule of law? The theory of intuitive law developed by a Russian legal scholar of Polish 
descent, Leon Petrazycki15, contains answers to those questions.
10 See also: Benn C. D. China’s Golden Age: Everyday Life in the Tang Dynasty. Oxford: University 
Press, 2004. P. 197. — English criminal law until the 18th century was also less tolerant: “all persons invoking 
any evil spirit, or consulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding, or rewarding any evil spirit; 
or taking up dead bodies from their graves to be used in any witchcraft, sorcery, charm, or enchantment; 
or killing or otherwise hurting any person by such infernal arts; should be guilty of felony and suffer death” 
(Blackstone W. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1769. P. IV, 6).
11 Hallevy G. A modern treatise on the principle of legality in criminal law. Heidelberg: Springer 
science & business media, 2010. P. 151.
12 For the influence of social policy and traditional ethics on Chinese law see: Chen J. Chinese Law: 
Context and Transformation. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
13 Farmer L. Making the modern criminal law: Criminalization and civil order. Oxford: University Press, 
2016. P. 19; Seredyńska I. Insider Dealing and Criminal Law: Dangerous Liaisons. Heidelberg: Springer 
Science & Business Media, 2011. P. 145–146.
14 The latter view was advanced by John Tasioulas who considered mercy outside the retributive 
demands of criminal justice, see: Tasouilas J.: 1) Punishment and Repentance // Philosophy. 2006. 
No. 81. P. 279–322; 2) Repentance and the Liberal State // Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law. 2007. No. 4. 
P. 485–521; 3) Where is the Love. The Topography of Mercy // Crime, punishment, and responsibility: The 
jurisprudence of Antony Duff. Eds Cruft R., Kramer M. H., Reiff M. R. Oxford: University Press, 2011. P. 37–
53.
15 Petrazycki L. Theory of Law and State.
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Psychological theory of Petrazycki and the discretionary power to 
exempt from punishment
Petrazycki developed his theory of intuitive law on the basis of psychology of moral 
impulsion. According to him, in order to understand courts’ judgements, one has to take 
into account not only the positive law that is set by the normative facts, that is a legislative 
directive, a legal custom, a judicial precedent16. It is also important to pay attention to the 
intuitive law which directs judges in making their decisions17. Intuitive law is based on a 
particular psychological experience of a legal obligation which is distinct from pure moral 
imperatives towards others. “Obligations conceived of as free with reference to others — 
obligations as to which nothing appertains or is due from obligors — we will term moral 
obligations. Obligations which are felt as compulsory with reference to others — as made 
secure in their behalf — we shall term legal obligations”18. 
Thus, the legal obligations are expressed in, as he called it, attributive imperatives, 
and the moral obligations are expressed in non-attributive imperatives, because such im-
peratives are not accompanied by a right of the other person involved to the action caused 
by the imperative. Similarly to the positive law, intuitive law contains imperative-attributive 
imperatives. But unlike the positive law they are found in human consciousness indepen-
dently from the normative facts such as a penal code. The intuitive law has a different 
source of the imperatives, which lies in the convictions and beliefs held by conscience. 
Both operate, however, together in what Petrazycki calls ‘the official law’19. They have 
equally binding force on its subjects. Thus, the intuitive law is identified with the official 
law: “Insofar as they concern objects within the cognisance of official law, the axioms of 
intuitive law are acknowledged also by state courts and other organs of state authority. In 
general the corresponding intuitive law is a constituent part of official law and a fundamen-
tal and essential element thereof”20.
The positive law itself can be considered as a product and manifestation of the intui-
tive law of those who establish it, although not all of it is directly derived from the intuitive 
law. “Legislative enactments may be based on considerations of interests and the like, 
which contradict the intuitive law conscience of the legislators themselves — or of the 
masses — and nevertheless bring to life the corresponding positive law”21. There are also 
many parts of the positive law which are irrelevant and neutral with respect to the intuitive 
law: questions of formalities, technical arrangements, and so forth. 
Petrazycki’s theory contains an explanation and a justification of the discretionary 
powers of criminal courts to exempt a guilty offender from punishment. According to Pe-
trazycki, the conflict between positive law and intuitive law is inevitable, and that it is in the 
court room where this conflict has to be settled. Not only may the intuitive law of one of the 
parties collide with the positive law, but so may the intuitive law of the judges whose role 
is to represent the intuitive law of the public22. The positive law and the intuitive law may 
coexist in relative harmony. This is a desired condition of the official law. In this context, 
one of the primary tasks of judges is to achieve this harmony. The intuitive law operates 
through interpretation of legal rules. “It exerts pressure upon the interpretation and ap-
16 Ibid. P. 477.
17 Ibid. P. 486–487, 573.
18 Ibid. P. 49–50.
19 Petrazycki L. Law and Morality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. P. 292.
20 Ibid. P. 293.
21 Ibid. P. 235.
22 Ibid. P. 234.
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plication of positive law in the direction of securing decisions in accord with (or as little as 
possible divergent from) the directives of the intuitive law conscience”23.
According to Petrazycki, the legislation on criminal offences gives only a general pat-
tern within which the intuitive law of the judges operates. The adaptation of general rules 
to concrete circumstances, the choice of the degree of punishment, or of the sum of an 
award, the evaluation of facts, — all these are governed by the intuitive law of the judges24. 
He writes: “In the official criminal law of civilised nations, the positive standardisation of 
punishments ordinarily indicates only the minimum and maximum limits of punishments, 
and definition of the specific punishments within these limits is left to the conscience of 
judges — that is to say, to their intuitive law. Even the decision as to whether or not the 
prisoner deserves punishment and should be recognised guilty (of an act which has been 
proved) depends on the conscience of judges and the jurors”25.
Thus, granting a greater degree of discretion to judges in exempting an offender from 
punishment does not mean that this issue is left to their arbitrary will to impose a penalty or 
not. In their capacity of a judge, they are bound by the intuitive law of the community. The 
advantage of a greater extent of the discretionary powers is that there will be less friction 
points between the intuitive law and the positive law which can render the application of 
criminal law more efficient. Therefore, the somewhat ambiguous formulations of Chinese 
criminal law on exemptions from punishment should not be perceived as a violation of the 
principle of rule of law. Rather, they express the intention of Chinese lawgiver to achieve 
some degree of social harmony by means of a more flexible approach to the infliction of, 
and the exemption from, punishment. It is noteworthy that social harmony is considered 
the ultimate objective of criminal law policy in China along with the rule of law26. In com-
parison, Thai criminal law does not offer a significant leeway to the courts to exempt an 
offender from punishment completely, although they retain powers to impose a lenient 
penalty if that is required by their intuitive law. 
The implication of Petrazhicki’ theory is that  the existing discretionary powers to ex-
empt an offender from punishment must not be perceived as a violation of the rule of law, 
or the principle of a uniform and equal applicability of general legal rules. The problem 
arises, however, when intuitive laws conflict with each other. In such situations, Petrazhicki 
was inclined to follow those attributive imperatives which are enlightened by the vision of 
a more desirable and rational law. 
Towards natural intuitive law
Petrazycki did not believe in the existence of immutable, eternal, and universal norms 
identified with the natural law which the positive law must comply with27. He was influenced 
by the Historical School of Jurisprudence by considering the contents of both intuitive and 
positive laws as changeable and dynamic. At the same time, he was sympathetic to the 
movement of the revived natural law28. Petrazycki attempted “to initiate and substantiate 
the idea of the possibility and necessity of creating a special science — the policy of law 
on the basis of a psychological study of law and its motivational and cultural-educational 
impact; this science is dedicated, in contrast to the existing jurisprudence, engaged in a 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. P. 293.
25 Ibid.
26 Lijuan Xing. The Rhyme of History: A Transition of Legal Culture in China Crowned by the Criminal 
Procedure Law 2012 // Asia Pacific Law Review 23. 2015. No. 1. P. 31–65.
27 Petrazycki L. Theory of Law and State. Ch. IV.
28 Ibid. Ch. V.
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historical study and the practical-dogmatic elaboration of existing law, to the development 
of the foundations of desirable, rational law and legislation29. 
Even though Petrazycki shared the prevalent skepticism towards the traditional theory 
of natural law, the search for the ideal of a desirable and rational law effectively places him 
within it. One can agree with Petrazycki that not all intuitive law is rational and desirable, 
and therefore, following the traditional terminology, not all intuitive law is natural. Intuitive 
law can be contradictory since it varies from an individual to an individual30. Therefore, 
in order to rationalize often irrational ethical impulsions that constitute individual intuitive 
law, one has to identify the standards of what is rational and desirable for the humankind. 
This is particularly important since the intuitive law is seen largely as the force which de-
termines the appearance, change, and the destruction of positive law31. The discussion of 
the relationship between intuitive law and positive law is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The Petrazycki’s ideas on their relevance to natural law has been considered to some ex-
tent somewhere else32. At this point, it is important to emphasize that the idea of intuitive 
natural law can be helpful in considering the exemptions from criminal liability and from 
punishment.
The similarities, such as found in Chinese and Thai criminal laws on exemptions from 
criminal liability, can be explained on the basis of psychological impulsions (in the mean-
ing of Petrazycki’s theory) which give rise to those exemptions. The justifiable defence 
and necessity are considered universally to be grounds for the exclusion of criminal li-
ability. If it is so, then why not to define them as the requirements of intuitive natural law 
as well as positive law? Petrazycki himself would claim that these requirements are only 
common among, what he called, “civilized nations”33. It is true that not every intuitive law 
(particularly among the barbarians preferring the standards of strict liability) would justify 
or excuse “objectively wrongful actions”34 in self-defence and necessity. However, already 
in the Biblical law of Moses (who allegedly lived somewhat sixteen hundred years before 
Jesus), we find the idea of justifiable killing in self-defence (Exodus, 22, 2–3). Jesus him-
self maintained that a person is not guilty of breaking sacred laws, whose violation was 
often punished by death, if acting out of necessity (Mathew, 12:14). In other words, there 
are some demands of intuitive law which cannot be reduced only to a particular civilized 
stage of legal development.
The idea of intuitive natural law seems logically flows from Petrazycki’s search for the 
science of legal policy and for a better operation of criminal law in general. It is also im-
portant as an intellectual platform for a critical analysis of diverse contemporary practices 
of exempting from punishment. It helps to identify the reasons for possible exemptions. 
29 Ibid. P. 378–379. — The Russian text runs as following: “Впрочем, в некоторой части новейшей 
литературы (последнего десятилетия XIX и начала XX столетия) появилось вновь признание есте-
ственного права, казавшегося окончательно и решительно устраненным из сферы научной мысли, 
и даже идет речь «о возрождении естественного права». Автор этого сочинения пытался путем ря-
да специальных исследований и основанных на них общих соображений возбудить и обосновать 
мысль о возможности и необходимости создания на почве психологического изучения права и его 
мотивационного и культурно-воспитательного действия особой науки — политики права, в частно-
сти — в области гражданского, цивильного права — цивильной политики, посвященной, в отличие 
от существующей юриспруденции, занимающейся историческим изучением и практически-догма-
тической разработкой действующего права, разработке начал желательного, рационального права 
и законодательства”.
30 Ibid. P. 381–382.
31 Ibid. P. 395–396.
32 Shytov A. N. Conscience and love in making judicial decisions. Heidelberg: Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2001.
33 Petrazycki L. Theory of Law and State. P. 104.
34 The term is sometimes used in American criminal case law: In re Levasseur, 737 F.3d 814 (1st Cir. 
2013).
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Among the competing ethical imperatives on what and who should be excluded from pun-
ishment, the theory of Petrazycki would cogently require an appeal to a purer and nobler 
intuitive natural law.    
Conclusion
Even though the positive law of diverse countries such as China and Thailand contain 
similar provisions on the exemption from criminal liability, there is a significant difference 
in relation to the discretionary exemptions from punishment. Chinese law allows judges to 
have more discretion in not imposing penalties on an offender than Thai law does. The rea-
son for the difference lies in a greater openness of Chinese law to moral considerations to 
be played in sentencing practices. Thai law is much more influenced by the philosophy of 
legal positivism. Its credo is that “there is no straightforward moral or social test of whether 
conduct is criminal. The most reliable test is the formal one: is the conduct prohibited, 
on pain of conviction and sentence?”35. Petrazycki’s approach challenges this commonly 
held belief. The test is found in the intuitive law that is experienced in attributive impera-
tives of our consciousness. 
In this aspect, Chinese law can accommodate better the intuitive law of the public 
to the exigencies of various social situations. There can be many reasons against giving 
judges extensive powers to apply their intuitive laws to exempt offenders from punish-
ment. There is a plurality of those imperatives which may conflict with each other. These 
reasons, however, will significantly lose their strength, if this discretion is limited by the 
precepts of natural law intuitively grasped by every moral agent. Even though Petrazycki 
did not argue for the existence of the natural law norms, its existence can be drawn from 
the force of attributive imperatives as well as from a striking similarity between various 
systems of criminal law in such diverse countries as China and Thailand.
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В статье сравниваются законодательные положения уголовного права Китая и Таилан-
да в отношении освобождения от наказания, которое следует отличать от освобождения 
от уголовной ответственности. При освобождении от уголовной ответственности нака-
зание невозможно. Напротив, при освобождении от наказания последнее возможно, но 
оно не налагается по судебному усмотрению. Законы Китая и Таиланда имеют сходство в 
определении освобождений от уголовной ответственности, но существенно различают-
ся в отношении дискреционных полномочий судов по освобождению от наказаний. Ки-
тайское законодательство, в отличие от тайского, позволяет судьям иметь больше сво-
боды действий не налагать наказания на нарушителя. Причина различий заключается в 
большей открытости китайского законодательства к моральным соображениям, которые 
следует учитывать в практике вынесения приговоров. На тайское право гораздо боль-
ше влияет философия правового позитивизма. Эти сходства и различия обсуждаются 
в свете теории Львa Петражицкого. Утверждается, что концепция интуитивного права, 
разработанная Петражицким, имеет важное значение для объяснения и оправдания 
полномочий суда освобождать от наказания, если это соответствует целям уголовного 
правосудия. С точки зрения Петражицкого, китайское право может лучше приспособить 
интуитивное право общественности к нуждам различных социальных ситуаций. Тем не 
менее теория Петражицкого сама по себе не может преодолеть многие доводы, по кото-
рым судьи не должны иметь широких полномочий применять свои интуитивные эмоции 
для освобождения нарушителей от наказания. Существует множество психологических 
факторов, которые могут конфликтовать друг с другом. Чтобы разрешить эти конфликты, 
необходимо опираться на идею естественного права. Несмотря на то что Петражицкий 
прямо не апеллировал к существованию естественного права, последнее можно вывести 
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из общих психологических факторов, а также из поразительного сходствa между различ-
ными системами уголовного права в таких разных странах, как Китай и Таиланд. Многие 
правовые положения их законов отражают определенные общие правовые парадигмы, 
которые не могут быть объяснены только принятием западных правовых концепций.
Ключевые слова: уголовная ответственность, наказание, Таиланд, Китай, психологиче-
ская теория права, Петражицкий.
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